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Affording Fundamental Rights: A Provocation Inspired by Mireille Hildebrandt 
 
Julie E. Cohen* 
 
 
Mireille Hildebrandt’s Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law (2015) raises questions 
for law that are best characterized as meta-institutional. This review essay considers the 
implications of Hildebrandt’s work for the conceptualization of fundamental rights. One 
consequence of the shift to a world in which smart digital technologies continually, 
immanently mediate and preempt our beliefs and choices is that legal discourses about 
fundamental rights are revealed to be incomplete along a dimension that we have simply 
failed to recognize. To remain effective in the digital age, rights discourse requires 
extension into the register of affordances. 
 
 
Mireille Hildebrandt’s Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law (2015) is a warning 
shot across the bow to legal thinkers striving to adapt existing legal systems to the 
challenges of networked digital technologies. Hildebrandt argues, among other things, 
that such technologies systematically threaten what have come to be understood as 
fundamental rights to privacy and self-determination (88-102), and that the complex 
construction known as the “rule of law” cannot serve as an effective guarantor of those 
and other fundamental human rights and freedoms in the digital age. According to 
Hildebrandt (176-81), the constituent elements of the “rule of law” are rooted in the 
technology of the printed word and particularly in the ways that printing facilitates 
stability, replication, deliberation, and universal application. Smart digital technologies 
systematically undermine those elements, producing operational results that are 
inconsistent with the root premises of modern Western systems of legal thought (181-83). 
From the standpoint of technology studies, the book might be seen as an 
intervention in the ongoing debate about the extent to which outcomes are 
technologically determined, and as substantially upping the ante in that debate. In 
addition to considering whether technologies have politics, we must now consider 
whether (some) technologies leave room for humans to practice politics at all.1 To map 
the complex relationships between the technical and the social in networked digital 
spaces—or what Hildebrandt calls the onliƒe world (41-42)—we must move beyond 
conceptions of the sociotechnical toward new conceptions designed to describe processes 
that operate on cognitive and perhaps even neurological levels. 
From the standpoint of legal scholarship, the book raises different questions that 
are best characterized as meta-institutional: to the extent that legal discourse and practice 
incorporate assumptions about the antecedent technical and architectural conditions of 
human freedom and democratic self-government, how might we do a better job of 
                                                 
* Mark Claster Mamolen Professor of Law and Technology, Georgetown Law. This review essay benefited 
from discussion at a Philosophers’ Reading Panel organized by Mireille Hildebrandt in connection with the 
2016 Conference on Privacy and Data Protection in Brussels. I thank Professor Hildebrandt for organizing 
the panel and inviting me to present, and for her editorial feedback. Thanks also to Paul Ohm for his helpful 
comments on an earlier draft and to Apeksha Vora for research assistance. 
1 The first question is Langdon Winner’s. See Langdon Winner, The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for 
Limits in an Age of High Technology 19-39 (1986). 
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developing new forms of discourse and practice predicated on the fact that those 
conditions have changed? And, on a deeper (and more disturbing) level, if what we 
understand as the hallmarks of legitimacy in legal reasoning and decisionmaking are 
themselves technologically embedded, how might we reinvent legal reasoning and 
decisionmaking to correspond to the new technical realities without, at the same time, 
sacrificing democratic legitimacy? If, as Hildebrandt argues (160-61), law and 
technology together constitute regimes of veridiction—which is to say that particular 
technological conditions provide the assumed background against which law both 
conceives and fulfills (or fails to fulfill) its assigned functions—then in the future, 
approaching the ideal of democratic self-government by means of a system of law will 
require different vernaculars, institutions, and practices. 
 
I. From Post-Phenomenology to Deep Configuration 
 
Hildebrandt situates her work within the emerging tradition of post-phenomenology in 
technology studies. Post-phenomenological analysis explores the ways that tools shape 
perceptions of reality by imposing their own implicit heuristics. 2  Methodologically 
speaking, that approach challenges strict constructivist approaches to technology, which 
operate on the premise that technologies are nearly or entirely malleable by the social and 
cultural systems within which they are situated.3 The post-phenomenological approach 
holds that that can never be entirely so. Even as we are busy configuring our tools, they 
are also busy configuring us. 
Not all technologies are created equal, however. Some exert especially deep 
structural effects on our thinking. So, for example, Lewis Mumford explored the effects 
of clock time on Western thought, arguing that the clock pervasively reshaped both 
rhythms of daily life and habits of thought after its own model.4 More recently, some 
commentators have argued that the networked digital communications technologies that 
make up the Internet, with their ability to collapse spaces and compress time, are 
producing a comparable shift. 5  Joseph Weizenbaum used the term “intellectual 
technology” to describe the effects of technologies like the clock and the Internet,6 
although the term may be something of a misnomer because the patterns of thought and 
behavior inculcated by such technologies are not deliberately chosen but rather so deeply 
embedded in habit and accepted practice as to be nearly invisible. In a sense, then, the 
effect of an intellectual technology parallels that of a scientific paradigm shift: like a 
paradigm shift, an intellectual technology structures the field of social activity and 
defines its horizons of possibility.7 Vast swaths of social activity move according to the 
patterns and rhythms that intellectual technologies impose. 
                                                 
2 Don Ihde, Postphenomenology: Essays in the Postmodern Context (1993); Peter-Paul Verbeek, What 
Things Do: Philosophical Reflections on Technology, Agency, and Design (2005). 
3 See, e.g., Wiebe Bijker et al., The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the 
Sociology and History of Technology (1987). 
4 Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization 12-18 (1963). 
5  Nicholas Carr, The Shallows: What the Internet Is Doing to Our Brains (rev. ed. 2011); Joseph 
Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgment to Calculation (1976). 
6 Weizenbaum, supra note 5, at 17-38. 
7 See generally Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2d ed. 1970). 
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I suspect that Hildebrandt would agree with the characterization of networked 
digital communications technologies as intellectual technologies, but the Internet is only 
a forerunner of the types of technological processes with which she is concerned, and her 
argument goes farther. Smart digital technologies do not simply structure our habitual 
patterns of thought and practice but augment and supplant them seamlessly, altering the 
very possibility for exercise of (what we understand as) thought, choice, and reason. This 
is so, she argues (88-102), both because smart technologies operate continually and 
immanently and because they are designed to learn, producing outcomes that their 
designers did not directly specify. 
If that is right—and Hildebrandt’s discussion is quite convincing—then it seems 
that smart digital technologies are radically different in kind from other technologies, and 
the mainstream of technology studies must learn to contend with their difference and 
their power. Bromides about the primacy of social shaping will not suffice. Social 
shaping remains present, of course, in the particularities of implementation (a point to 
which I will return below), but in addition to tracing the contours of sociotechnical 
processes, we must now learn to identify and explore the “cogito-technical” or even 
“neurotechnical” processes that the technologies themselves produce, and trace those 
processes operating on individual and social levels.  
Turning back to the question of politics, one might perhaps conclude that handing 
over processes of learning and choosing to smart environments entails a politics of a sort 
(and that the technologies may perhaps then proceed to develop a politics of their own 
along lines that we cannot foresee), but if we are not all to become paranoid Terminator 
fantasists, we will need to do better. We must learn new methods of forming and parsing 
questions about the politics of smart digital technologies, and of making normative and 
prescriptive choices that bite effectively on their operation in real-time. The remainder of 
this review essay explores one particular subgroup of issues, which has to do with the 
way that fundamental rights are described and understood. 
 
II. Fundamental Rights Three Ways 
 
One consequence of understanding smart digital technologies in the way that Hildebrandt 
describes—as continually, immanently mediating and preempting our beliefs and 
choices—is that legal discourses about fundamental rights are revealed to be incomplete 
along a dimension that we have simply failed to recognize (because we have not needed 
to do so). Rights discourse requires extension into a different register, without which it 
has little chance of remaining effective in the digital age. 
 
A. Rights as/and Liberties 
 
The most traditional kind of discourse about fundamental rights consists of 
taxonomies of the various civil and political or social and economic freedoms to which 
people should be entitled. That is the discourse of the leading human rights instruments, 
which consist for the most part of relatively simple, aspirational statements, and it is the 
customary vernacular of contemporary human rights institutions charged with 
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administering those instruments.8 The taxonomic approach to elaborating fundamental 
rights in turn gives rise to taxonomies of violations and corresponding protocols for 
responses by the international community. Because rights can come into conflict with one 
another and also with legitimate public goods, it also gives rise to the mediating concept 
of proportionality, which comes into play in determining the extent to which rights may 
be curtailed or infringed.9 
Over the years, the taxonomies commonly found in the major human rights 
instruments have engendered various critiques. Three in particular are worth noting here. 
First, critics of a liberty-centered approach to rights discourse observe that framing rights 
as liberties does not necessarily guarantee the actual enjoyment of those liberties as a 
practical matter. That charge has particular force where social and economic rights are 
concerned, but exercising fundamental civil and political rights also requires resources 
and capabilities that may be out of reach for many, particularly (but not only) in the 
world’s least developed countries.10  Second, some argue that the traditional form of 
human rights discourse in fact privileges culturally specific formulations of human 
wellbeing that are (among other things) liberal and individualist rather than more 
communally oriented.11 Some such critiques have been deployed as apologias for civil 
and political repression—for example, arguments about religious freedom advanced as 
justification for the subordination of women. Even so, the observation that individualist 
formulations do not necessarily capture everything that there is to say about rights is an 
important one. Third, many scholars have noted that the state-centered language of 
human rights instruments and institutions does not address or even recognize the extent to 
which powerful corporate entities can exert sovereignty over human wellbeing.12 The 
second form of rights discourse, which concerns capabilities, and the nascent third form, 
which concerns structural conditions, advance thinking about each of these problems. 
 
B. Rights as/and Capabilities 
 
The critique of rights conceived as liberties engendered the second form of rights 
discourse, which concerns the necessary requirements for human beings and human 
societies to flourish. Thinkers and practitioners affiliated with the capabilities approach to 
human development point out that human wellbeing requires both sufficient access to 
essential resources and development of the capabilities necessary to function fully and to 
                                                 
8  See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 172; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); Human 
Rights—Handbook for Parliamentarians, United Nations (2016), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HandbookParliamentarians.pdf. 
9 See generally Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning (Grant Huscroft et al. 
eds., 2014). 
10 For two very different expressions of this view, see Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (1999); Eric 
A. Posner, Human Welfare, Not Human Rights, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1758, 1767-79 (2008). 
11 See generally Alison Dundes Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism Versus Relativism 
(1990). 
12 See, e.g., Chris Jochnick, Confronting the Impunity of Non-State Actors: New Fields for the Promotion 
of Human Rights, 21 Hum. Rts. Q. 56 (1999); David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The 
Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 931 
(2004). 
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pursue individual and political self-determination. Although the precise relationship 
between “rights” and “capabilities” is contested, because many components of human 
flourishing are goals pursued collectively, the capabilities approach envisions a human 
rights agenda as having important communal dimensions.13 For the same reason, this 
approach also draws attention to the central role that resource distribution—both within 
and across societies—plays in human wellbeing. 
Notably for my purposes here, even as they answer the charges that an 
understanding of fundamental rights cannot be based solely on liberties and/or formulated 
solely in individualist terms, capabilities theorists have differed over how a capabilities-
based theory of fundamental rights ought to be expressed. Some, including most 
prominently Martha Nussbaum, emulate the discourse of /rights-conceived-as-liberties/, 
developing lists of the centrally important capabilities.14 That method reflects allegiance 
to the liberal individualist tradition from which the discourse of /rights-conceived as-
liberties/ originated, although it also departs from that tradition in some important ways. 
A second, welfarist strand of thinking connects more directly to a radical democratic 
politics emanating from the postcolonial/global south. Its adherents, including most 
prominently Amartya Sen, are more concerned with the flexibility to pursue locally 
appropriate policies than with making lists, and more concerned with respecting local 
variations in the forms of self-determination than with fidelity to a single, overarching 
vision of the good life.15 
One might understand the tensions between Aristotelian and welfarist conceptions 
of capabilities for human flourishing, and more abstractly between different conceptions 
of the relationship between rights and capabilities, as contests over how best to go about 
developing a fully articulated discourse of /rights-conceived-as-capabilities/ that would 
command the same respect as, and assume equal place with, the discourse of /rights-
conceived-as-liberties/ on the world stage. In part the continuing obstacles to the 
capabilities project are political and reflect both global geopolitical imbalances and the 
influence of private economic power, but the methodological issue is also important.16 In 
a sense this is the problem of the master’s tools and the master’s house restated: will it be 
sufficient for the discourse of /rights-conceived-as-capabilities/ to emulate the structure 
and method of the discourse of /rights-conceived-as-liberties/, or does it need to be 
different? 
                                                 
13 See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 273, 292-300 
(1997); Polly Vizard et al., Introduction: The Capability Approach and Human Rights, 12 J. Hum. Devel. & 
Capabilities 1 (2011). 
14 Martha C. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach 31-36 (2011). 
15 Sen, supra note 10; Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, 32 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 315-56 
(2004). 
16 Outside the academic realm, differences over the proper way to understand and assess capabilities play 
out more concretely in the ongoing debates over what standards ought to be used in the United Nations’ 
annual Human Development Reports and in measuring progress toward the various iterations of its 
development goals. Capabilities thinkers participating in those projects have been concerned chiefly with 
the methodological tyranny of utilitarianism, but the practical relationship between capabilities and rights is 
a recurring minor theme. See, e.g., Sakiko Fukuda-Parr & Alicia Yamin, The Power of Numbers: A Critical 
Review of MDG Targets for Human Development and Human Rights, 56 Development 58 (2013); Sakiko 
Fukuda-Parr, The Metrics of Human Rights: Complementarities of the Human Development and 
Capabilities Approach, 12 J. Hum. Devel. & Capabilities 73 (2011). 
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Importantly, however, capabilities discourse still remains relatively insensitive to 
sociotechnical issues. Discussions of material agency revolve around equal access to 
information and property ownership, but typically do not address the material 
environment’s constraints and affordances.17  Development discourse, for its part, has 
come to rely heavily on data-intensive measurement practices, and has been relatively 
insensitive to privacy and other concerns that may arise as a result of collection, 
dissemination, and use of data from and about the subjects of development efforts.18 As 
we will now see, taking affordances seriously does not simply require an extension of the 
discourse of /rights-conceived-as-capabilities/, but rather requires an entirely different 
way of understanding and describing fundamental human entitlements. 
 
C. A Thought Experiment 
 
Consider four imaginary (or not-so-imaginary) countries, each of which formally 
recognizes for all citizens the fundamental right of freedom of association.  
The first country enacts a law prohibiting gatherings of more than twenty persons 
and requiring that anyone who attends a public gathering present identification papers. 
The result is a situation that is readily intelligible within contemporary human rights 
discourse as a violation of citizens’ associational rights. Prohibitions on and surveillance 
of public gatherings are familiar tools of civil and political repression, and are universally 
understood as such. 
The second country is one in which many citizens lack the means to enjoy the 
rights of freedom of association as a practical matter. The living quarters available to 
those citizens are located in remote and far-flung neighborhoods from which travel to the 
public spaces in urban centers is expensive, and from which travel to public spaces 
located in well-to-do suburban or exurban enclaves is logistically infeasible. In any event, 
the need to earn a living wage precludes the leisure time required to gather for pleasure or 
political protest. This situation presents facts of the sort with which the capabilities 
approach is concerned. If there is a violation here, it inheres in the background conditions 
of distributional inequality that prevent equal enjoyment of the civil and political 
freedoms necessary for human flourishing.  
In the third country, the laws of physics and the properties of the only available 
building material simply do not permit the construction of any spaces larger than three 
meters square. The resulting architecture is hivelike: it affords essentially no scope for 
large-scale public gatherings. And yet it is difficult to think of that architecture as 
presenting a human rights violation because other architectures are simply impossible to 
imagine. The immutable, nonnegotiable physical constraints and affordances of the hive 
become part of the background against which rights discourse takes place. 
In the fourth country, there are two types of building materials. The first, 
substantially less expensive than the second, has conductive properties that facilitate the 
capture and recording of sounds and conversations. The country constructs its public 
                                                 
17 See Julie E. Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and the Play of Everyday Practice 226-
29 (2012). 
18 See Linnet Taylor, Data Subjects or Data Citizens? Addressing the Global Regulatory Challenge of Big 
Data, in Information, Freedom and Property: The Philosophy of Law Meets the Philosophy of Technology 
81-105 (Mireille Hildebrandt & Bibi van den Berg eds., 2016). 
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spaces using the less expensive material. We would need more facts to evaluate the 
decision completely—for example, perhaps the costs of the second material are so 
extreme that the state cannot afford to use them, or perhaps the second material would 
produce severely adverse environmental effects. Assuming no such facts, might one 
argue that the state has an affirmative obligation to select the second material? To frame 
that choice as implicating fundamental rights requires a different vernacular for rights 
discourse than either of the two already mentioned—a discourse that recognizes the 
central role of sociotechnical configuration in affording and constraining the freedoms 
and capabilities that people in fact enjoy. 
 
D. Rights as/and Affordances 
  
Fundamental rights are made available, or not, partly by the content and institutional 
structure of the applicable legal regime and partly by patterns of resource distribution that 
enable people to attain the capabilities to enjoy fundamental freedoms, but also partly by 
the constraints and affordances of the physical environment. We are learning now that the 
relevant constraints and affordances include both those directly affecting human behavior 
in physical space and those governing flows of information.  
Until relatively recently, rights discourse has operated with a set of unstated and 
often unexamined assumptions about the built environment’s properties—assumptions 
both about constraint (e.g., the physical impossibility of universal surveillance) and about 
lack of constraint (e.g., the open-ended possibilities for construction of gathering spaces). 
Advances in networked digital communication and information processing have drawn 
those assumptions into question. The affordances of networked digital technologies for 
both expression and control of expression, and for both anonymity and enhanced 
surveillance, have prompted the United Nations to commission a series of special 
investigations and reports,19 but there does not yet seem to be any serious discussion 
about how to construct a vernacular for rights discourse that would incorporate notions of 
constraint and affordance as core conceptual building blocks. 
The problem here is parallel to the one that capabilities discourse has surfaced, 
but it resides in the realm of the sociotechnical rather than the socioeconomic: When our 
background assumptions about the constraints and affordances embedded in the physical 
environment fail to hold, what then? We can choose to tolerate a basic level of hypocrisy 
around the conditions of possibility for, e.g., speech or surveillance (as is the case with 
rights discourse that ignores the problem of capabilities in an era of vast and growing 
                                                 
19 Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While 
Countering Terrorism, Fifth Annual Report, General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/70/371 (Sept. 18, 2015) (by 
Ben Emmerson); Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion 
and Expression, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/32 (May 22, 2015) (by David Kaye); 
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While 
Countering Terrorism, General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/69/397 (Sept. 23, 2014) (by Ben Emmerson); 
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, 
Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/40 (Apr. 17, 2013) (by Frank La Rue); Special Rapporteur 
on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Human Rights 
Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011) (by Frank La Rue); Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, 
Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/37 (Dec. 28, 2009) (by Martin Scheinin). 
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economic inequality), or we can expand the frame of reference of rights discourse to 
encompass the architectural. As has been the case for capabilities, moreover, discussion 
of sociotechnical considerations that is framed in terms of enabling conditions for /rights-
conceived-as-liberties/ will be open to the charge that it is vague and overinclusive.20 
Answering that charge requires developing a separate and distinct discourse of /rights-
conceived-as-affordances/. 
Questions about affordances for fundamental rights cannot simply be subsumed 
into capabilities discourse. Though still emerging, the discourse of /rights-conceived-as-
capabilities/ has different types of concerns and operates in a correspondingly different 
register. To define a right in terms of capability is to specify a minimum threshold (of 
material wellbeing, literacy, or some other good) below which people cannot as a 
practical matter enjoy the civil and political rights they are presumed to possess. By 
contrast, if we are concerned with architecture, the conversation becomes one about the 
ways that enjoyment of fundamental rights is informed by systemic tolerances and 
prohibitions. Matters requiring attention include both the actions that are required—e.g., 
presenting a credential to gain access to a particular space—and the range of actions that 
are permitted—e.g., the ability to gain access using a credential that is authenticated but 
anonymized, or to move about that space without generating granular, identity-linked 
traces. 
The distributional questions that surround a discourse of /rights-conceived-as-
affordances/ also are different than those that attend either liberties or capabilities 
discourse. Access to information and communications capabilities may, of course, be 
distributed differentially—and so some kinds of claims about access to networked digital 
resources ought to figure prominently in formulations of /rights-conceived-as-
capabilities/ 21 —but other types of questions about networked communication and 
information processing protocols are systemic, and are centrally concerned with how 
particular functionalities are achieved. So, for example, if access to credit or employment 
increasingly is mediated in ways that produce racial or socioeconomic segmentation, the 
discourse of /rights-conceived-as-liberties/ would highlight the discrimination and the 
resulting relative disadvantage to disfavored groups; the discourse of /rights-conceived-
as-capabilities/ would highlight the disadvantaged groups’ diminished access to essential 
resources and the resulting functional handicap; but the discourse of /rights-conceived-as-
affordances/ would focus on the infrastructural configurations that enable market 
segmentation to proceed and to evade oversight.22 It also would identify distributional 
effects that the capabilities discourse does not capture and that relate to the 
reconfiguration of the networked digital environment to facilitate large-scale data 
harvesting, which in other work I have likened to the opening of new territories for 
colonization.23 
 
 
                                                 
20 See, e.g., Robert Sugden, Welfare, Resources, and Capabilities, 31 J. Econ. Lit. 1947 (1993). 
21  For an illustrative list of information-related capabilities, see Lea Bishop Shaver, Defining and 
Measuring A2K: A Blueprint for an Index of Access to Knowledge, 4 I/S: J.L. & Pol’y Info. Soc’y 235 
(2008). 
22 See, e.g., Mary Madden et al., The Class Differential in Privacy Vulnerability (working paper 2016); 
Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017). 
23 Julie E. Cohen, The Biopolitical Public Domain (working paper 2015).  
2017 Critical Analysis of Law  Vol. 4:1 
9 
 
III. Baby Steps 
 
The project of articulating and protecting /rights-conceived-as-affordances/ requires 
attention to the kinds of infrastructural and operational details with which the discourses 
of /rights-conceived-as-liberties/ and /rights-conceived-as-capabilities/ generally have not 
engaged. Rudimentary efforts to achieve the necessary level of operational granularity 
appear in statutes and regulations that impose procedural requirements for surveillance by 
law enforcement, such as the U.S. Wiretap Act, and in European data protection 
regulations, but neither of those templates has translated well to the socially networked 
digital era.24 Articulating a discourse of /rights-conceived-as-affordances/ and developing 
institutions and practices for operationalizing that discourse requires a vernacular akin to 
that employed by engineers and technologists who develop and implement system 
specifications. Yet the project of articulating /rights-conceived-as-affordances/ cannot be 
a technocratic exercise, but one of thinking in and through language and practice to 
reimagine the linkages between information flows and human freedom. 
As one illustration of the difference that a discourse of /rights-conceived-as-
affordances/ might make, consider the debate among European scholars over whether 
data protection is best understood as a separate fundamental right or as a way of 
implementing certain aspects of the fundamental right to privacy.25 The answer is both—
and neither. The “right to privacy” is a right articulated within the discourse of /rights-
conceived-as-liberties/, but because privacy-related expectations and practices are 
relational, contextual, and spatial in character, they have never fit particularly well within 
the implicit parameters of that discourse. 26  The “right to data protection,” which is 
concerned with the conditions under which personal information may be collected, 
processed, used, and retained, is an entitlement better suited to articulation within the 
emergent discourse of /rights-conceived-as-affordances/. The seemingly inexorable drift 
toward consent as a universal legitimating condition mixes apples and oranges; consent is 
a liberty-based construct, but effective data protection is first and foremost a matter of 
design. 
A different kind of strategy for translating the fundamental right to privacy into a 
discourse of /rights-conceived-as/affordances/ involves recognizing and naming the 
material and/or technical conditions that afford (or disafford) privacy as a practical 
matter. So, for example, Hildebrandt’s compelling new formulation—“the right to co-
determine how we will be read” (102-03)—is a statement of fundamental rights that is 
framed in terms of affordances, and that encompasses privacy-related considerations.27 
                                                 
24 See Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522; Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data 
Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1; Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31. 
25 See, e.g., Gloria Gonzalez Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental Right of 
the EU (2014); Lee A. Bygrave, Data Protection Pursuant to the Right to Privacy in Human Rights 
Treaties, 6 Int’l J.L. & Info. Tech. 247 (1998); Orla Lynskey, Deconstructing Data Protection: The “Added-
Value” of a Right to Data Protection in the EU Legal Order, 63 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 569 (2014). 
26 For discussion of the misalignment, see Cohen, supra note 17, at 107-26. 
27 As this formulation is intended to suggest (and as capabilities discourse already illustrates), there is no 
reason to impose a requirement of one-to-one correspondence or to expect such correspondence.  
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Although we cannot entirely escape the constitutive force-fields generated by our 
technologies—and hence it would be intellectually dishonest to speak of a right to 
“determine” our own legibility to other human and non-human actors—we can and 
should expect to have a say. That expectation in turn can be translated into more concrete 
requirements relating to transparency, choice parameters, and other operational matters. 
Similarly, my own construct of “semantic discontinuity,” or gaps within the interstices of 
sociotechnical shaping, addresses the relationship between infrastructure and social 
shaping in a way that speaks to the spaces left over for self-determination, and that bears 
on privacy issues.28  
Both of these formulations offer more than just new kinds of abstract rhetoric 
about the importance of human freedom. They are ways of directing attention not to the 
content of laws or the discretion of enforcers, but rather to required sets of sociotechnical 
conditions. They envision reconfiguring rights discourse all the way down, so that it 
speaks with effective force to new kinds of material and operational considerations.29 
And in so doing, they point to the need for a complementary set of principles and 
practices for rethinking the design of material and technical infrastructures from the 
ground up. An example of what that project might look like is the work by Paul Ohm and 
Jonathan Frankle on “desirable inefficiency” in the design of digital systems and artifacts, 
which identifies design practices that conventional, efficiency-driven thinking would 
disfavor and links those practices to specific regulatory functions and values.30 
Notably, a discourse of /rights-conceived-as-affordances/ seems likely to lend 
special rigor to the articulation of a set of rights that often have seemed to sit on the 
periphery of conventional human rights discourse, and indeed ultimately may reveal 
those rights to be much more pivotal than has commonly been supposed. Within smart 
environments, rights to privacy, autonomy, and self-determination—reconceived in terms 
such as the right to co-determine how we will be read and the right to a baseline level of 
semantic discontinuity—seem likely to emerge as core protections for fundamental rights 
in the digital era. At the same time, however, attention to affordances underscores the 
extent to which privacy, autonomy, and self-determination—rights that the discourse of 
/rights-conceived–as-liberties/ casts inexorably in individualistic terms—are from a 
different perspective inherently communal. As a practical matter, securing their 
enjoyment requires universally-applicable material and operational guarantees.  
Because it is addressed to problems of sociotechnical configuration, a discourse of 
/rights-conceived-as-affordances/ also seems likely to engender a more direct reckoning 
with the problem of private power. Consider now a fifth country, in which public spaces 
have been systematically, pervasively privatized. Persons wishing access to those spaces 
must satisfy privately imposed security requirements and adhere to privately decreed 
standards of conduct. As a way of enforcing the security requirements, their oral and 
written communications within those spaces are recorded, monitored, and retained. The 
result of those restrictions is that freedom of association is substantially diminished. 
Because contemporary human rights frameworks and institutions have focused 
principally on abuses of power by sovereign states, however, they are correspondingly 
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unlikely to identify the situation in the fifth country as presenting a problem within their 
competence to address. 
Concern about the problem of private power is a longstanding theme within 
human rights scholarship and activism. In the wake of the global economic crisis of 2008 
and the Snowden revelations about the U.S.-driven cooptation of privately operated 
networked communication infrastructures for mass surveillance, such concerns have 
begun to play a greater role at official levels as well. In 2008, the United Nations 
Secretary-General appointed a Special Representative to supervise the development of a 
framework and a set of guiding principles intended to nudge multinational corporations 
toward behavior more consistent with existing human rights norms.31 The United Nations 
also has sponsored a series of special reports dealing with the power of information 
intermediaries and the threats that counterterrorism efforts pose to fundamental rights and 
liberties.32 The principles have no independent legal force, however, and the reports have 
served only to underscore the extent of the problem.  
Because networked communication technologies and protocols have 
predominantly private-sector origins, a discourse of /rights-conceived-as-affordances/ 
would require a different set of institutional practices and strategies from the outset. It 
therefore might prove an effective starting point for the project of addressing and 
defining the human rights obligations of private economic actors. 
 
IV. Not Out of the Woods Yet: Concluding Thoughts on Hildebrandt and the Rule 
of Law 
 
The ultimate guarantor of fundamental rights, of course, is a shared commitment to the 
rule of law, and here we must reckon with a second consequence of understanding smart 
digital technologies as continually, immanently mediating and preempting our beliefs and 
choices. As Hildebrandt explains (176-81), the constructs of the rule of law upon which 
we have relied depend from start to finish on the affordances and temporal rhythms of the 
printed word. Smart digital technologies make pattern-based, personalized decisions 
rather than principled, generalizable ones, and they don’t give reasons for—or even draw 
attention to—the choices they make. And so the book seems to raise the possibility that 
perhaps in the digital era we cannot have the rule of law—or fundamental rights—at all.  
That argument, however, may prove too much. It doesn’t necessarily follow that 
some other veridical construct—call it “rule of law prime”—could not be developed. 
Here it becomes important to remember that conceptions of the rule of law are 
themselves culturally situated. To take one example, consider the running debate among 
U.S. legal scholars about sources of legitimacy for the modern administrative state. 
Daniel Ernst’s history of the U.S. administrative state traces its origins to a particular 
conception of what the rule of law ought to entail, rooted in the legal process model and 
defined in opposition to the European bureaucratic tradition.33 As modern administrative 
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practice has moved steadily away from the legal process model, that shift has prompted 
renewed scholarly efforts to locate administrative law’s legitimating principles.34 At the 
same time, it is abundantly clear both that the modern U.S. system works on a pragmatic 
level and that Europeans do not regard their own regulatory system as lawless.35  
It is important to remember, as well, that both the rule-of-law ideal and the 
concrete practices and institutions that attempt to operationalize it are only ever proxies 
for more substantive questions of justice. So, for example, a strand of critique within the 
human rights literature paints the contemporary turn to rule-of-law rhetoric as itself a 
dodge—a way of excusing substantive failures of protection for fundamental rights as 
long as sufficiently respectable procedures have been followed.36  
If Hildebrandt is right, what seems to be needed at this point are reforms that 
move on both institutional and conceptual levels—that produce a different way not only 
of operationalizing but also of understanding the requirements of a system of justice. 
Those are large challenges. And yet the project of developing a different form of 
discourse about fundamental rights provides one example of how such challenges might 
be approached—not by abandoning ideals, but rather by tethering their formulation more 
tightly to contemporary material and operational realities. 
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